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Abstract

This dissertation presents a collection of manuscripts that describe development of models
and model implementation to analyze impact of potential A(H7N9) pandemic influenza outbreak
in the U.S. Though this virus is still only animal-to-human transmittable, it has potential to become
human-to-human transmittable and trigger a pandemic. This work is motivated by the negative
impact on human lives that this virus has already caused in China, and is intended to support public
health officials in preparing to protect U.S. population from a potential outbreak of pandemic scale.
An agent-based (AB) simulation model is used to replicate the social dynamics of the
contacts between the infected and the susceptible individuals. The model updates at the end of
each day the status of all individuals by estimating the infection probabilities. This considers the
contact process and the contagiousness of the infected individuals given by the disease natural
history of the virus.
The model is implemented on sample outbreak scenarios in selected regions in the U.S.
The sampling results are used to estimate disease burden for the whole U.S. The results are also
used to examine the impact of various virus strengths as well as the efficacy of different
intervention strategies in mitigating a pandemic burden.
This dissertation, also characterizes the infection time during a A(H7N9) influenza
pandemic. Continuous distributions including exponential, Weibull, and lognormal are considered
as possible candidates to model the infection time. Based on the negative likelihood, lognormal
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distribution provides the best fit. Such characterization is important, as many critical questions
about the pandemic impact can be answered from using the distribution.
Finally, the dissertation focuses on assessing community preparedness to deal with
pandemic outbreaks using resilience as a measure. Resilience considers the ability to recover
quickly from a pandemic outbreak and is defined as a function of the percentage of healthy
population at any time.
The analysis, estimations, and metrics presented in this dissertation are new contributions
to the literature and they offer helpful perspectives for the public health decision makers in
preparing for a potential threat of A(H7N9) pandemic.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background
A(H7N9) is a subtype of influenza A viruses that is found in birds including poultry. Since
March of 2013, A(H7N9) has been found in several regions of China infecting humans, especially
those who are in close contact with poultry either at farms or at markets dealing with poultry. So
far, there has been four waves of infections in spring of 2013 and winters of 2013-14, 2014-15,
and 2015-16. The fifth wave of infections is currently in progress. As of April 2017, a total of 1393
laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H7N9) infections resulting in 534 deaths [1] have been recorded
in several different regions of China spreading at least ten provinces and two municipalities.
Additional cases are expected to have occurred in other regions, though have not yet been reported.
It may be noted that the outbreaks have occurred in relatively densely populated regions of China
that have over 54% of the country’s population. The average age of those infected in the first three
waves is around 58 [2], and the majority of the infected had a high level of exposure to poultry
(e.g., in live bird markets, and some commercial and backyard farms). The higher average age of
the infected has not been attributed to the epidemiological features of A(H7N9). This virus is not
considered to have acquired the ability to transmit among humans.
From a public health preparedness standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact
of a pandemic caused by the A(H7N9) virus, potential for which is considered to be high. Similar
concerns for an impending pandemic were expressed by the public health community with another
potent mutation of influenza virus H5N1 during years 2003-2009. Sporadic outbreaks of H5N1
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during there years infected a total of 468 people in 15 countries causing 282 deaths [3]. This virus
is also only animal-to-human transmittable. Till date, H5N1 has not acquired the ability to spread
human-to-human infection and is still under surveillance.
Researchers have closely examined the A(H7N9) infection scenarios in recent years and
published their findings in several papers [4–10]. The findings include estimates of some of the
epidemiological parameters. It is important to note that only symptomatic cases of A(H7N9)
infections visited the doctor and were documented in the above official reports. It is difficult to
assess the percentage of asymptomatic cases, but some researchers have estimated this value to be
50% [11].
An important observation made so far about A(H7N9) is that, though it is highly pathogenic
both in humans and birds, infected poultry remains asymptomatic. This makes it difficult to
identify the spread of A(H7N9) among poultry. In recent years, the Chinese government has
applied containment measures to limit the spread of A(H7N9) virus including culling birds in large
numbers and closing live poultry-markets and trading areas [12].
In our effort to assess impact of a pandemic from A(H7N9) virus, we used an updated
version of our previously developed AB simulation model [13–15]. The simulation model
replicates the dynamics of a given population during a pandemic outbreak by incorporating the
demographic information (households, schools, workplaces, and communities), human behavior
(including contacts, compliance to quarantine and other public health measures, and travel),
epidemiological parameters of the virus (force of infection, incubation and latent periods, basic
reproduction number, and fatality rate), and non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies for
containment and mitigation. The AB model considers detailed information about the households
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and their member compositions (age, sex, work, parental status), distance between individuals,
their daily schedules, contact processes, infection process, and disease natural history.
We assumed that during outbreaks, non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategies are
used to contain virus spread. A NPI strategy comprises measures like isolation, quarantine, and
school and workplace closures. Parameters defining these measures were chosen in our study
based on recommendations found in [15]. Some of our AB simulation model features were adapted
from the models presented in [11] and [15].

1.2 Goals and Objectives
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of a potential influenza pandemic
outbreak caused by A(H7N9) virus in the U.S. This goal has been addressed through the following
objectives.
1. Improve an existing AB simulation model by incorporating a more detailed approach to
estimate the probability of infection.
2. Develop disease burden estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak affecting
the whole United States.
3. Determine the probability distribution characterizing the infection time of a A(H7N9)
pandemic outbreak.
4. Assess community preparedness to face pandemic outbreaks using resilience measures.

Objective 1 was achieved by incorporating in an existing simulation model a detailed
approach from the literature [11] to estimate the force of infection, a key input to evaluate the
probability of infection of a susceptible individual. This updated version of the model was first
validated using information from a simulated outbreak in Thailand presented in [11]. Objectives 1
3

and 2 are considered in the manuscript discussed in Chapter 2. Objective 3 was achieved by
analyzing typical continuous distributions using the negative log likelihood as a decision criteria
(see Chapter 3). Objective 4 was addressed by developing resilience measures and evaluating the
measures for different virus strengths and intervention strategies. Details of these measures are
presented in Chapter 4.

1.3 Summary of Manuscripts
The first manuscript estimates the disease burden of a potential A(H7N9) influenza
pandemic in the U.S. using an agent-based (AB) simulation model. This AB model has an inherent
capacity limitation of simulating only up to five million people. This limitation is attributed to the
limited memory availability in standard desktop computers and to the nature of memory usage by
the AB model. To work within this limitation, we used a procedure that divides the U.S. in clusters
using the number and the density of urban population as predictors. Within each cluster, a subset
of states were selected to simulate independent pandemic outbreaks. If a selected state had an urban
population below five million, the model considered all urban regions for the simulated outbreak;
else, only selected contiguous counties within the state with up to five million people were
considered as the outbreak region. The results from the sample states were integrated using a
sampling approach, and burden estimates were calculated for each cluster. Results for the clusters
were used to obtain estimates for the whole U.S. Infection attack rates (IARs) for transmission
scenarios with R0=1.5 and 1.8 (with 95% C.I.) were found to be 18.78% (17.3-20.27) and 25.05%
(23.11-26.99), respectively.
The second manuscript examines the probability distribution that characterizes the
infection time for a potential A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak. The data needed for this was
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obtained by implementing an AB simulation model on three different scenarios of transmissibility
of the A(H7N9) virus. Common continuous probability distributions were analyzed and it was
concluded, based on the negative log-likelihood, that the lognormal distribution provides a good
fit.
The third manuscript first presents a resilience measure that can de used to assess
community preparedness. It then considers an A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak and
evaluates the community resilience measures for three different transmissibility scenarios with and
without NPIs.
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Chapter 2: Estimating Disease Burden of a Potential A(H7N9) Pandemic Influenza
Outbreak in the United States

The complete article Estimating Disease Burden of a Potential A(H7N9) Pandemic
Influenza Outbreak in the United States (submitted to BMC Public Health) can be found in
Appendix B.

2.1 Abstract
Since spring 2013, periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China has
heightened concerns for a possible pandemic outbreak though it is believed that the virus is not yet
human-to-human transmittable. Till June 2016, A(H7N9) has resulted in 781 laboratory-confirmed
cases of human infections causing 313 deaths (40% fatality rate). This paper presents disease
burden estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak throughout the United States.
Estimation method uses a machine learning technique to divide 50 states into three clusters based
on urban population size and density, and thereafter employs an agent based (AB) model to
simulate outbreaks in selected states from each cluster. Infection attack rates (IARs) stratified by
age-groups from these states are used to arrive at disease burden estimate for the whole U.S. For
transmission scenarios with R0=1.5 and 1.8, overall IARs (95% C.I.) are found to be 18.78% (17.320.27) and 25.05% (23.11-26.99), respectively.
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Infection Time during a Potential H7N9 Influenza Pandemic
Outbreak

The complete article Analysis of the Infection Time from a Potential H7N9 Influenza
Pandemic Outbreak can be found in Appendix C.

3.1 Abstract
Avian influenza viruses have been affecting human populations for a long time since the
outbreak in the year 1580, the first recorded in history. Since then, other mutations and
reassortments of the influenza viruses (e.g., H1N1, H3N2) have emerged causing pandemics.
Recent emergence of A(H7N9) influenza virus in China resulted in 1307 laboratory-confirmed
cases of human infections causing 489 deaths (37.4% fatality rate). Researchers have developed
early estimates of some of the epidemiological parameters to characterize A(H7N9) virus in China.
In this research we examine the distribution that characterizes the infection time from a potential
A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak using results from an agent-based (AB) simulation model.
The AB model replicates the dynamics of contacts between susceptibles an infected individuals.
We examined some of the common continuous probability distributions and conclude, based on
the negative log-likelihood, that the lognormal distribution provides a good fit to characterize the
infection time.
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Chapter 4: Resilience as a Measure of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza Outbreaks

The complete article Resilience as a Measure of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza
Outbreaks can be found in Appendix D.

4.1 Abstract
Periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China in recent years has
heightened concerns for a possible pandemic outbreak. From a public health preparedness
standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact of an influenza pandemic and also the
resilience of the affected communities, which is the ability to recover quickly from a pandemic
outbreak. The aim of this study is to develop community resilience measures and demonstrate their
estimation using a simulated pandemic outbreak in a region in the U.S. with a population of 1.2
million. Three scenarios are analyzed with different combinations of virus transmissibility rates
and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The agent-based simulation model replicates human
interactions, spread of infection and resulting impact on human lives and society. Average
percentage of healthy population at any point in time during a pandemic is used to quantify a
resilience metric. Based on this new metric, it is demonstrated that resilience is improved between
1.82 and 7.25 times when recommended NPIs are deployed.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions

This dissertation is a collection of manuscripts that analyzes different aspects of a relatively
new mutation of influenza virus A(H7N9). The key aspect that is studied is the estimation of
disease burden from a pandemic outbreak across the whole U.S. from A(H7N9) virus. The other
aspects examined are: 1) characterization of infection time during a pandemic, and 2) development
of a community resilience measure and examining its use in assessing preparedness in dealing with
an influenza pandemic. Detailed conclusions from all three of the studies are presented at the end
of each of the manuscripts, and hence will not be repeated here. In the rest of this section, we
discuss some of the limitations as well as future extensions of the work presented in the
dissertation.
The version of the AB model that was used in this dissertation has limited capability in
terms of the total number of people that it can simulate. Due to this limitation, we had to use a
clustering and sampling approach to estimate disease burden for the whole U.S. Also, due to the
capability limitation, we focused our attention to only urban areas and extrapolated the results to
over all areas. This is a simplification, as it is well known that the population dynamics and
resulting contact processes in rural areas are different from urban areas. As an extension to this
dissertation, a graphical processing unit (GPU) based AB simulation model is being developed.
This model is capable of simulating much wider outbreaks with higher number of people (> 100
millions). The model also is much more granular as it incorporates added features like: specific
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coordinates for households, businesses, and community places; local and long distances travels;
use of antivirals and vaccines; and existing immunity.
We estimated the best probability distribution that describes the infection from among a
set of continuous distributions. When NPIs are deployed, infected time exhibits multi-modal
behavior which cannot be captured by a classical continuous distribution. However, though our
chosen distribution with estimated parameters has acceptable goodness of fit, it can be further
improved through perhaps a mixture of distributions. It may also be prudent to classify the
infection time data based on age groups. As different influenza viruses tend to have different agetargets.
Resilience metrics estimated in this study were found to be useful in quantifying the
efficacies of NPI policies. This helps the decision makers to consider not only the estimate of
disease burden but also the resilience of the community. However, future studies in this field may
develop new metrics considering cost and other impact measures like loss of productivity.
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ABSTRACT
Aim
Since spring 2013, periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China has heightened
the concern for a possible pandemic outbreak, though it is believed that the virus is not yet humanto-human transmittable. Till January 2017, A(H7N9) has resulted in 918 laboratory-confirmed
cases of human infections causing 359 deaths. The aim of this paper is to present disease burden
estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak spread over all 50 contiguous states of the
U.S. with a total population of 307 million.
Method
The method uses a machine learning technique to divide 50 states in the U.S. into a small number
of clusters based on urban population size and density. Thereafter, for a few selected states in each
cluster, the method employs an agent-based (AB) model to simulate influenza pandemic outbreaks.
The model uses demographic data published by U.S. Census bureau, and epidemiological data
from published research reports on H7N9. A few selected non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
were applied on the outbreaks. For two different epidemiological scenarios with 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 and 1.8,
infection attack rates (IAR) and the number of deaths were estimated.
Results
Overall IARs (95% C.I.) for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 and 1.8 were found to be 18.78% (17.3 – 20.27) and 25.05%
(23.11 – 26.99), respectively. The corresponding number of deaths (95% C.I.), in millions, were
estimated to be 23.9 (22.0 – 25.8) and 31.9 (29.4 – 34.6).
Conclusions
Our results represent a worst-case scenario where no antivirals or vaccines are administered and
the pandemic is considered to have spread over the whole contiguous territory of the U.S. The
results are also likely to be somewhat higher due to the fact that only dense urban regions (around
3% of the geographic area) with approximately 81% of the population were used for simulating
sample outbreaks. Outcomes from these simulations were extrapolated over the remaining 19% of
the population spread sparsely over 97% of the area. Furthermore, the full extent of possible NPIs,
if deployed, could also have lowered the estimates.

I.
INTRODUCTION
A(H7N9) has infected humans in China in three waves, spring 2013, winter 2013-14, and winter
2014-15. The fourth wave is currently in progress. As of January 2017, a total of 918 laboratoryconfirmed cases of A(H7N9) infections have been recorded in China causing 359 deaths [1].
Figure 1 depicts the outbreak locations which are in relatively densely populated regions with over
54% of China’s population. The reported average ages of those infected in the first three waves
are 61, 57, and 56, respectively [2]. However, the relative high age of those infected has not been
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attributed as an epidemiological characteristic of A(H7N9). Instead, it is conjectured to be a
function of the higher level of exposure to poultry for elderly. Though most of the infections are
known to be isolated cases, exceptions were noted where human-to-human transmission may have
occurred. For example, there were at least sixteen clusters of three infected family members and
one cluster of two infected family members [3]. However, there is still lack of sustained evidence
of human-to-human transmission [1].

Fig. 1.

Extent and impact of waves of A(H7N9) outbreaks in China

Experts fear that A(H7N9) could become human-to-human transmittable and cause a pandemic.
Hence, from a public health preparedness standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact
(disease burden) of a A(H7N9) pandemic. A significant fear of a H5N1 pandemic outbreak existed
during the years 2003-2009, when the virus infected a total of 468 people with 282 deaths in 15
countries [4]. These numbers were updated in 2015 to 844 infected and 449 deaths [5]. Research
papers published in 2005 [6] and 2006 [7] critically examined the impact of potential H5N1
outbreaks. The disease burden in the U.S. from the H1N1/09 outbreak has been estimated to be
60.8 million infections and 12,469 deaths [8].
Examinations of A(H7N9) infections [9–15] present some of the epidemiological parameters for
the virus. A comparison of A(H7N9) parameters, with those for H5N1 is shown in Table I [16].
A(H7N9) is highly pathogenic both in humans and birds but infected poultry remain asymptomatic
and do not die.
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The objective of this paper is to present an estimate of the disease burden of a potential A(H7N9)
influenza pandemic in the U.S. The estimate is obtained using our agent-based simulation model
which were published in previous versions [17–20]. A systematic review of the pandemic
simulation models can be found in [21]. We implemented the AB model separately in a few
selected states representing the U.S. and used their results to estimate burden on U.S. The AB
model is limited to simulating up to five million people per run. This is due to limited memory
capacity in desktop computers and how memory is utilized by the AB model. The simulation model
replicates the dynamics of pandemic outbreak by incorporating the demographic information
(households, schools, workplaces, and communities), human behavior (contacts, compliance to
quarantine and other public health measures, and travel), epidemiological parameters of the virus
(force of infection, incubation and latent periods, basic reproduction number (R0), and fatality
rate), and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The AB model considers household member
compositions (age, sex, work, parental status), distance between individuals and their daily
movements, contact processes, infection process, and disease natural history.

In order to select the representative states to simulate A(H7N9) outbreak, we first classified 50
states into clusters using urban population size and density as predictors. These are highly
correlated to the spread of influenza virus. The classification technique yielded a number of
clustering alternatives (Figure 2), of which we selected the 3-cluster alternative. Clusters 1 to 3
contained states in an increasing order of predictor value combinations. Figure 3 depicts the cluster
designation for the states. We selected New Mexico from cluster 1, Colorado and Oregon from
cluster 2, and California and New York from cluster 3. Selection of these five states was influenced
by a recent paper [22] that presents disease burden estimates for seasonal influenza.
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Fig. 2. Dendrogram with the list of states contained within three clusters

Fig. 3. Map of 48 states of U.S. designated to clusters 1(white), 2(gray), 3(black). States marked
with lines were selected for outbreak simulation. Not shown in the figure are Alaska (cluster 1)
and Hawaii (cluster 2).
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For California and New York with urban population sizes greater than five million, we selected a
number of urban counties within each state with a cumulative population less than or equal to five
million. While for Colorado, Oregon, and New Mexico we simulated their total urban population,
each less than 5 million. Our focus on urban population was guided by the fact that approximately
81% of the population of the selected states reside in dense urban regions constituting on average
3.4% of the land area. We used latest census data to extract information on households,
workplaces, and schools. We implemented a non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategy
comprising measures like isolation, quarantine, school and workplace closures. Pharmaceutical
interventions (vaccines and antivirals) were not considered.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the clustering technique, the
AB simulation model and its main features, and the parameter estimation method from stratified
data. Section 3 presents validation of our AB model. Section 4 presents model parameter values.
Results and conclusions are presented in Section 5 and 6, respectively.
II. METHODS
A. Clustering Method
We used a hierarchical clustering method. Predictor values were first normalized by subtracting
from each the corresponding mean and dividing by the corresponding standard deviation. The
method begins by assigning each state to a separate cluster (50 clusters at start). Then it calculates
the Euclidean distances between the predictor vectors (size, density) of all cluster pairs. Identifies
the cluster pair with the smallest distance and combines them into one cluster. This reduces the
number of original clusters by one, and for the combined cluster, its predictor vector is assigned
as the centroid of the predictor vectors of the two constituent clusters. At the next step, the
distances between the clusters are updated, and the process repeats until all clusters are combined
into one single cluster. A line diagram (called, dendrogram) is then used in selecting an acceptable
number of clusters considering a desired level of similarity within each cluster. We implemented
the clustering method by first using preprocess function within the Caret package of R library to
normalize the data. Thereafter, we used the predict, dist, and hclust functions within the stats
package of R library for the remaining steps of the method. R is a free and open source language
and environment for statistical analysis (https://cran.r-project.org/).
B. AB Simulation Model
We updated an existing AB model [17–19] by incorporating the method for estimating force of
infection found in [6]. The model mimics the contact process and tracks each individual in an
outbreak region using their scheduled hourly movements within the mixing groups: households,
places (schools and workplaces), and communities. The model begins by generating the mixing
groups and the individuals according to the census and demographic data. Each individual is
assigned a household, a place, and a subset of the community locations to visit daily. At the end
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of each day, the model estimates the force of infection for each susceptible individual. The force
of infection is then used to determine if an individual becomes infected. AB model components
are described next.
B1. Disease Natural History
An infected individual simultaneously begins a latency and an incubation period (based on
parameters given in Table I). The individual displays symptoms (unless asymptomatic) at the end
of the incubation period, and becomes infectious after the latent period is complete. Following the
infectiousness period, an infected either recovers or dies. Recovered becomes immune. As no
estimate of the proportion of asymptomatic cases is reported for A(H7N9) so far, we assumed it to
be 50% as considered in previous studies [6]. The duration of infectiousness for each case is
calculated using a lognormal random generator with parameters given in Table VI.
B2. Infection Model
An individual i is considered to accumulate force of infection 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 in his/her home, in places, and in
community locations. It is calculated as in [6]:
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = �
+
+

𝑘𝑘|ℎ𝑘𝑘 =ℎ𝑖𝑖

�

𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘|𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘 =𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖

𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽ℎ 𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 )𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 [1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 (𝜔𝜔 − 1)]
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 )𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 �1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 (𝜔𝜔𝜓𝜓𝑝𝑝 (𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘) − 1)�
𝑗𝑗

𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖

∑𝑘𝑘 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘 𝜍𝜍(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 )𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 )𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 )[1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 (𝜔𝜔 − 1)]
∑𝑘𝑘 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 )

(1)
The first component in (1) expresses the force experienced by susceptible individual i at home
from other infected household members k. The second component captures the force experienced
at places (schools and workplaces) when a susceptible i is in the same place as infected k. The third
component considers all infected members of the community as a function of their distances from
the susceptible i. The parameters of (1) are defined in Table II. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is calculated at the end of each
day for all susceptible i and the probability of infection is obtained as 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 . It is assumed
that if not infected by the end of a day, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is reset to zero.
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B3. Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention
We considered isolation of symptomatic infected individuals at home for a specific duration with
isolation compliance of 53% for adult workers and 57.5% for non-workers [19]. A compliant
infected individual is assumed to stay home all day. We consider an isolation threshold of one day
(that is, on average an individual diagnosed with infection does not begin isolation until the day
after) and isolation duration of seven days, based on the disease natural history.
We also considered household quarantine that restricts the movement of susceptible household
members when one or more members are infected. Household quarantine parameters were
considered same as for individual isolation. Children were assumed to fully comply with isolation.
A partial school closure approach closed a classroom when a threshold of newly infected children
in the classroom was reached. A threshold for the number of closed classrooms was used to close
a school.
We used a threshold value of one for both the classroom closure and school closure and closure of
21 days. Workplace closure strategy was similar to that of school closure where each
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department/group was treated like a classroom. The thresholds were: three cases to close a
department, 30% of the departments closed to close a workplace, and seven days for closure
duration.
C. Disease Burden (IAR) Calculation from Estimates Stratified by Cluster and Age-Groups
We first calculated the mean and C.I. of the IAR, for all three age-groups (indexed by a) in all
sampled states (indexed by i) within each cluster (indexed by j), using replicated results of the AB
𝑠𝑠
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎
simulation model. The 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. was calculated as 𝑝𝑝̂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
± 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼�2,𝑛𝑛−1 , where 𝑝𝑝̂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
denotes
√𝑛𝑛

the mean IAR, n represents the number of simulation replicates, and s represents the standard
deviation of the replicated estimates. Mean IAR values for the clusters were obtained by combining
𝑎𝑎
into 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 using the expression below [23].
the values of 𝑝𝑝̂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆

1

𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 = 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 ∑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
𝑗𝑗

(2)

𝑎𝑎
where Sj denotes the total number of selected states that were simulated within cluster j, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
represents the size of the urban population in state i within cluster j for age-group a. Note that
𝑆𝑆

𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎
𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 = ∑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
is the total urban population for the selected states in cluster j for age-group a. The

100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. on the IAR estimate for each age group within a cluster was obtained as 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ±

𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼�2,𝑛𝑛−1

𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎

√𝑛𝑛

. The pooled standard deviation 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 was calculated from the replicated estimates of IAR
2

2

𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎
for each selected state within a cluster as the square root of �(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗1
+ ⋯ + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
�/
[𝑘𝑘(𝑛𝑛 − 1)], where k is the number of selected states in cluster j, n is the number of simulation
𝑎𝑎
replicates, and 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
is the standard deviation of replicated estimates for age-group a in state k within
cluster j. Hereafter, we combined the IAR estimates from all clusters into one value for each agegroup using
1

𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 ∑𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ,

(3)

where C denotes the number of clusters, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 denotes the total population of all the states in cluster
j in age-group a, and 𝑁𝑁 𝑎𝑎 denotes the total population in the country in age-group a. It may be noted
that the estimate 𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 has a variance 𝑉𝑉 𝑎𝑎 from two sources of variability: 1) due to sampling: a sample
population from each cluster is used to estimate 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 , which is then considered to hold good for the
𝑎𝑎
whole cluster population, 2) due to simulation based estimation: 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ’s are obtained from 𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
, which
are estimated from simulation model with inherent variability. It can be argued that these two
sources of variability are independent. We obtained the variance due to sampling 𝑉𝑉1𝑎𝑎 as follows
[24],
1

2 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 −𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎

𝑉𝑉1𝑎𝑎 = (𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎)2 ∑𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1�𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 � �

𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎

𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 �1−𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 �

��

𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 −1

�.

(4)

The variance due to simulation 𝑉𝑉2𝑎𝑎 was obtained as the pooled variance from the variance estimates
2

2

2

(𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ) of the three clusters as 𝑉𝑉2𝑎𝑎 = �((𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠1𝑎𝑎 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠2𝑎𝑎 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠3𝑎𝑎 �/[3(𝑛𝑛 − 1)], where
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n is number of simulation replicates per cluster. A 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. was calculated as 𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 ±
𝑎𝑎

𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼�2,𝑛𝑛−1 �𝑉𝑉 �𝑛𝑛 . Finally, we obtained a single estimate of IAR (𝑝𝑝̂ ) for the whole U.S. across all

age-groups 𝑎𝑎 𝜖𝜖{1,2, … , 𝐿𝐿} using (3) and substituting in the equation 𝑁𝑁, 𝑁𝑁 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 for 𝑁𝑁 𝑎𝑎 , 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 and
𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 , respectively, and summing over a = 1 through L. The variance V on the overall IAR estimate
was obtained by pooling variance values 𝑉𝑉 𝑎𝑎 from the three age-groups. A 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. was

calculated as 𝑝𝑝̂ ± 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼�2,𝑛𝑛−1 �𝑉𝑉�𝑛𝑛 .

III. MODEL VALIDATION
We validated our model by replicating a H5N1 outbreak study for Southeast Asia [6]. The study
considered 85 million people. We considered a subset of people (5M) and proportionately adjusted
down the number of households, schools, workplaces, and community locations. As in [6] we
considered two different 𝑅𝑅0 (1.5 and 1.8) values and ran ten replicates for each. For 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5, the
average IAR (𝑋𝑋�) is 34.58% with a standard deviation (s) of 5.24, and 95% C.I. of [30.83 - 38.33].
The IAR reported in [6] for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 is 33%, which is within our C.I. Our corresponding values
for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.8 are 55.7%, 8.16, and [49.86 - 61.54], respectively. The IAR reported in [6] is 50%.
IV. DISEASE BURDEN ESTIMATION: PRELIMINARIES
The AB simulation model was implemented considering only the urbanized regions of the five
selected states. Table III shows the population sizes and their distribution between urban and rural
regions. Urban population of Colorado, New Mexico, and Oregon are below the 5 million
threshold of our AB model capacity. Hence, for these states, the AB model used total urban
population as sample sizes. For example, Colorado was simulated using the total urban population
of 4.62M as the sample size comprising 1.19M for ages ≤ 19, 2.83M for ages 20 – 64, and 0.59M
for ages 65 and above (see Table IV). For California and New York, we adopted a proportional
sampling approach. For example, California has 9.7M people for age-group ≤ 19 years and 22.4M
and 4.74M for age-groups 20 – 64 years and ≥ 65 years, respectively. The AB model used the
family composition features from the U.S. census to randomly generate a total of (9.7/36.8)x5M
children, (22.4/36.8)x5M adults up to age 64, and (4.74/36.8)x5M adults 65 and above. Also using
census data, the model first creates a proportional number of households in a region and then
populates each household following the average proportion of children and adults in various agegroups in U.S. families as presented in Table V. Thereafter, the model generates the places (schools
and workplaces) using census data in [24] and [25], and randomly assigns each individual to a
place based on the age-group. Beyond households and places, the model also considers movements
of the individuals in the community within the state for daily errands. Same proportions given in
Table V are used for all five selected states.
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The AB model initiated each outbreak by introducing six infected individuals. The parameter
values used to calculate 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 using (1) are shown on Table VI (for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.8). To calculate the third
component of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 , we assumed, for simplicity, that each day an individual (susceptible or infected)
travel within or outside of their county of residence for errand or leisure. Distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 was
obtained as the distance (in kilometers) between the center of the county locations for susceptible
i and infected k. Similar parameters were also used in [26].
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𝑎𝑎
) displayed on Table IV.
The AB simulation model gives us as outcome the mean IAR values (𝑝𝑝̂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎
We used the estimated values of 𝑝𝑝̂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 to estimate 𝑝𝑝̂𝑗𝑗 , using (2), IAR per age-group within a
cluster. These values were then combined to obtain estimate of IAR for each age-group (𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 ) in the
whole U.S. Finally, IAR values for all age-groups were combined to obtain the overall IAR
estimate (𝑝𝑝̂ ).

V. DISEASE BURDEN ESTIMATION: RESULTS
Ten replicates of independent simulation runs were made for each of the five selected states from
three density clusters. We collected age-stratified output data (IAR). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the
IARs and their C.I.s, which can be seem to be generally higher for states/clusters with higher
population density.
The IARs for the five states were then used to calculate IARs for the corresponding clusters. Tables
VII and VIII show IARs and number of infected cases per age-group within each cluster combined.
IAR estimates across all clusters within the age-groups (𝑝𝑝̂ 𝑎𝑎 in (3)) and across all age-groups (𝑝𝑝̂ ),
and the number of fatalities are shown in Table IX.
The IAR estimates were compared with IAR estimates for other viruses as shown in Table X.
Simulation-based estimates of IAR for both H5N1 and A(H7N9) were found to be much lower
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than the field estimate for H1N1/2009. We conjecture that the lower IAR estimates are due to
lower estimates of the force of infection, for which the parameters were estimated from only
animal-to-human transmittable cases of outbreaks.

Fig. 4. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group ≤ 19yrs

Fig. 5. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group 20 – 64 yrs
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Fig. 6. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group 65+ yrs
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VI DISCUSSION
Our paper is the first to estimate disease burden from A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak across the
whole U.S., hence we could not directly compare our results with other A(H7N9) study. The
disease parameter estimates used in our model were adopted from the recent reports on
epidemiological studies of A(H7N9) [2, 9, 16, 29]. Other models (e.g., using differential equations)
have been used to analyze A(H7N9) [28 – 30]. These models do not have the level of granularity
of agent-based simulation models which can consider each individual in the population, their
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household and age distribution, workplaces, schools and communities, daily schedule of activities,
and travel behavior. However, such granularity comes with the cost of computation and memory
usage, which resulted our model capacity to be limited to 5 million people per simulation run. We
note that the limit can be increased with better computing hardware and more efficient usage of
memory. Considering the five states that were selected for simulation, the 5 million limit only
applied to California and New York. For the other three states, simulations were run for the whole
urban population as the total population for each of these states are below 5 million. For California
and New York, we used an agent-based proportional sampling approach to select up to 5 million
individuals from the urban areas.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A recent paper in June 2016 [2] presented a comprehensive analysis of the laboratory-confirmed
cases of A(H7N9) infection in mainland China. It presented renewed estimates for incubation
period, fatality risk, hospital admission to death/discharge, median age, and poultry exposure. We
note, however, that the parameter estimates that we used from an earlier study [16] do not differ
significantly from those presented in [2]. Though it appears from the published data that A(H7N9)
affects more people of higher age group, it is likely a function of the very high level of poultry
exposure (≥ 74% [16]) for the older age group. Our AB model does not incorporate any agedependent factor for calculating probability of infection. However, our model does consider agebased contact process, which in turn affects the infection probability.
We simulated outbreaks only in urban areas and extrapolated the results to the population in the
remaining (rural) areas. Urban areas constitute on average 3.4% of the geographic area and
approximately 81% of the population [27]. Hence, the disease burden estimates, for each state,
cluster, age-group as presented here, are likely to be upper bounds, as the population in rural areas
are likely to be less affected. Also, applications of vaccines and antivirals were not considered in
our AB model, which increased the number of susceptible and the intensity of infection,
respectively. Furthermore, the disease burden estimates could have been lowered by application
of the full extent of NPIs.
Our AB simulation model has the following notable limitations. It does not assign specific
geographic locations for the households, places, and communities. As a result, we had to use
estimated values for the distance between susceptible and infected �𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 � in equation (1)) in
calculating the force of infection. Use of antivirals could have reduced the profile of infectiousness
with a lower peak and shorter duration reducing the virus spread and the corresponding IAR. Also,
we did not consider pre-existing immunity for any age-group in the population.
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